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RECENT CASES
AUTOMOBILES - NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE - DRIVER SUBJECT TO
PERIODS OF UNCONSCIOUSNESS. - Defendant while driving his car
suffered an attack of fits causing him to lose control of his car re-
sulting in the death of a pedestrian. The defendant, who knew he
was subject to epileptic fits which caused periodic unconsciousness,
was indicted on charges of criminal negligence under the New York
criminal negligence statute.1 The Supreme Court, Appellate Divis-
ion, dismissed the defendant's demurrer and on appeal the New
York Court of Appeals, three justices dissenting, held that the de-
fendant's act of driving his car when he knew he was subject to
periods of unconsciousness was sufficient disregard for the welfare
and safety of others to constitute criminal negligence. People v.
Decinia, 2 N.Y.2d 133, 138 N.E.2d 799 (1956).2
Rarely have attempts been made to obtain a conviction for a
criminal offense under conditions similar to those in the instant
case. In a 1951 New Jersey case a conviction for criminal negli-
gence was sustained where the defendant driver became uncon-
scious and was involved in an accident resulting in the death. of
another.3 Convictions of criminal negligence as well as involuntary
manslaughter have been sustained where sleepiness' or intoxication'
have impaired the ability of the driver and the resulting uncon-
1. N. Y. Sess. Laws 1936, c. 733 1 1053-a. "A person who operates or drives any
vehicle of any kind in a reckless or culpably negligent manner, whereby a human being .s
killed, is guilty of criminal negligence in the operation of a vehicle resulting in death."
Section 1053-b provides for a fine of up to one thousand dollars or five years imprisonment
or both on conviction of criminal negligence.
2. See People v. Eckert, 2 N.Y.2d 126, 138 N.E.2d 794 (1956); decided on the
same day in which the court gave a similar opinion on facts almost identical to those
of the instant case.
3. State v. Gooze, 14 N.J. Super. 277, 81 A.2d 811 (App. Div. 1951) (Defendant
had been hospitalized for treatment of Meniere's Syndrome, a malfunction of the semi-
circular canal of the inner ear, which subjects the person so afflicted to spells of dizziness
and "blacking out". At the time of the accident the defendant had not had such an at-
tack for over a year, but had been warned by his physician of the possibility of the -e-
currence of an attack). This decision was criticised by the South Dakota Supreme Court
in Espeland v. Green, 74 S.D. 484, 54 N.W.2d 465 (1952), a civil case, in which the
operator of the car who was subject to fainting spells became unconscious and was in-
volved in an accident which caused injury to his guest passenger. Because of the guest
statute in South Dakota (S. D. Code § 44.0362) it was necessary to show wilful and
wanton misconduct of the driver if the Plaintiff was to recover damages. The South Dakota
court, in holding that the defendant was not guilty, was of the opinion that the -xossi-
bility of injury to another person in these instances was too remote to constitute wilful and
wanton negligence.
4. People v. Robinson, 253 Mich. 507, 235 N. W. 236 (1931); State v. Olson, 108
Utah 377, 160 P.2d 427 (1945). (The courts held in these cases that the defendant
must have been aware of the possibility of his going to sleep while driving if the con-
victin was to be sustained.) For a good report of digests of recent cases involving liabi-
lity due to disabilities of drivers of vehicles, see 28 A. L. R.2d 1§ 12-104 Supp. Service
1-50 (1948-1957).
5. People v. Townsend, 214 Mich. 267, 183 N.W. 177 (1921); State v. Brady, 244
Minn. 455, 70 N.W.2d 449 (1955); State v. Kline, 168 Minn. 263, 209 N.W. 881 (1926).
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sciousness is the proximate cause of the death of another. Courts
have also sustained convictions of involuntary manslaughter6 and
negligent homicide 7 where the person in control of the car permits
one incapable of driving to operate the car.
In the instant case, the court held that the defendant's act of
driving the car knowing he was subject to attacks of fits constituted
culpable negligence as was required for conviction by the statute."
A number of courts have held that gross negligence or a wilful and
wanton disregard for the safety of others must be shown to sustain
a conviction of criminal homicidef However at least two courts
have held that criminal homicide laws are strictly police regulations
for the protection of the public and that gross negligence is not
necessary to sustain a conviction.1"
The detision in the instant case has -particular significance in
North Dakota since the 1957 Legislature has passed a criminal
homicide act similar to the New York statute. 1 However the appli-
cation of the negligent homicide law at the present time is some-
what vague, as North Dakota already has statutes providing for the
punishment of a person convicted of driving vehicles while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor 2 and of reckless driving, 3 and
6. Story v. United States, 16 F.2d 342 (D. C. Cir. 1926).
7. People v. 'Ingersol, 245 Mich. 530, 222 N.W. 765 (1929).
8. See People v. Angelow, 246 N.Y. 451, 159 N.E. 394 (1927). (In this case,
which was cited in both tho majority and minority opinion of the instant case and n
People v. Eckert (see note 2 supra) the court held that "[clulpable negligence is therefore
something more than the slight negligence necessary to support a civil action for damages.
It means disregard for the consequences which might ensue from the act and indifference
to the rights of others.") (The minority opinion in the instant case maintained there was
no culpable negligence "No motorist suffering from any serious malady or infirmity can
with impunity drive any automobile at any time or place, since no one can know what
physical conditions make it 'reckless' or 'culpably negligent' to drive an automobile. Such
a construction of a criminal statute offends against due process and against justice and
fairness." People v. Decinia, 2 N.Y.2d 133, 138 N.E.2d 799, 809 (1956) (dissent).
9. See, e.g., State v. Homme, 226 Minn. 83,.32 N.W;2d 151 (1948); State v.
Diamond, 16 N.J. Super. 26, 83 A.2d 799 (App. Div. 1951).
10. People v. McMurchy, 249 Mich. 147, 228 N.W. 723 (1930); State v. Wojhan,
204 Ore. 84, 282 P.2d 675 -(1955). The Michigan negligent homicide statute was the
first of its kind to be enacted in the United States. Act 98 of Public Acts of 1921 § 1.
"Every person who by the, operation of any vehicle at an immoderate speed or in a
careless, reckless or negligent manner, but not wilfully or wantonly, shall cause the death
of another, shall he guilty of the crime of criminal homicide . . ." This statute has been
superseded by § 750.324 Compiled Laws of Mich. which defines the crime in practically
the-same terms. In holding the first statute constitutional the court said: "There is :no
doubt but that the legislature was prompted to pass a law to curb reckless, careless and
negligent driving which caused death in cases where negligence was less than gross." Ore.
Rev. Stat. § 163.090 provides: "When the death of any person ensues within one year
as the proximate result of injuries caused by the driving of any vehicle in a negligent
manner . . . the-person so driving such vehicle . . . is guilty of negligent homicide . . ."
11. N. D. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 263 (the laws of the 1957 Legislative session are not
yet printed, but this is the tentative assignment according to the Secretary of State.)
"When the death of any persqn ensues within one year as a proximate cause of the injury
received by driving of any vehicle in a reckless disregard of the safety of others, the per-
son so operating the vehicle shall be guilty of negligent homicide."
12. N. D. Rev. Code § 39-0801 (Supp. 1953).
13. N. D. Rev. Code § 39-0803 (Supp. 1953).
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the North Dakota Supreme Court has sustained convictions of sec-
ond degree manslaughter where a driver's recklessness caused the
death of another.14 These situations are therefore already provided
for. It seems that if the statute is to be of material significance in
improving the safety of the North Dakota highways, it will be
applicable to situations such as those in the instant case.15
MERVIN A. TUNTLAND.
CORPORATIONS - ACQUISITION OF MEMBERSHIP - CO-OPERATIVE
PATRON'S APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP DENIED. - The Cherry-
Todd Electric Co-operative, Inc., a non-profit, non-stock, corpora-
tion was converted to a co-operative under statute. The creating
statute provided that patrons of the electric co-operative were not
required to become members but such patrons should have the
right to become members upon such terms as may be prescribed in
the by-laws. The by-laws provided, inter-alia, that membership
could orly be attained by acceptance for membership by the Board
of Directors or members. A special meeting was held to vote on a
proposed change of the principal place of business. Plaintiff's ap-
plication for membership and right to vote at this meeting were
denied. In affirming the trial court, the Supreme Court of South
Dakota held that the co-operative acting through its Board of Di-
rectors or its members does not possess the right to deny an appli-
cant's membership. Meyers v. Lux, 75 N.W.2d 533 (S. D. 1956).
Corporations may prescribe through by-laws the qualifications
necessary for membership and the procedure by which membership
may be acquired.' In the absence of statutory provisions a corpo-
ration is said to have the implied or incidental power to admit
members;2 the consent of the parties is essential since the relation-
ship is contractual. 3 A non-profit corporation has the right to estab-
14. State v. Tjaden, 69 N.W.2d 272 (N. D. 1955).
15. In North Dakota the only automobile accident cases of a criminal nature where
the physical or mental disability of the *drivers has been involved are cases in which the
driver was under the influence of intoxicating liquor. In State v. Hanson, 73 N.W.2d 135
(N. D. 1955), the North Dakota Supreme Court held that only the slightest physical or
mental disability due to the drinking of intoxicating beverage would sustain a conviction
for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. If the court in so holding has
adopted a policy of construing the law so as to prevent drivers with physical disabilities
from driving automobiles and thereby jeopardizing the lives and property of others, it is
probable that a conviction of negligent homicide obtained under conditions similar to
those in the instant case would be sustained.
1. Stewart v. Monongahela Val. Country Club, 177 Pa. Super. 632, 112 A.2d 444
(1955).
2. See State v. Sibley, 25 Minn. 387 (1879); Ellerbe v. Faust, 119 Mo. 653, 25
S.W. 390 (1894).
3. 18 C. J. S., CORPORATIONS § 478.
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